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Optimal Consumption and Investment with Insurer
Default Risk
Abstract
We solve the optimal consumption and investment problem in an incomplete
market, where borrowing constraints and insurer default risk are considered jointly.
We derive in closed-form the optimal consumption and investment strategies. We
find two main results by quantitative analysis. As insurer default risk increases, the
proportion of wealth invested in stocks could increase when wealth is small, and
decrease when wealth is large. As risk aversion increases, the voluntary annuity
demand could increase when insurer default risk is low, and decrease when this risk
is high.
Keywords: optimal consumption, optimal investment, insurer default risk, annuity de-
mand
JEL Classifications: C61, E21, G11
1 Introduction
The financial crisis of 2008 has driven an increase in concern about risk of potentially
catastrophic pension default, which causes significant decrease in pension benefits.1 This
uncertainty is a result of a wide variety of global financial and demographic trends. The fis-
cal pressure on the public pension system is increasing because of increase in life expectancy
and decrease in birthrates. The support ratio, i.e., the ratio of workers to pensioners, is
also decreasing in most of the developed world.2 The fiscal deficits are expected to con-
tinue for the foreseeable future, at least, until effective legislation is enacted or benefits are
changed.3 Pension plans are inevitably affected negatively by a funding deficit, so pension
benefits must decrease.4
1According to the pension fund return statistics in selected OECD countries (Figure 1), corporate and
public pension systems in most countries have undergone large and negative returns on their public pension
funds during the recent economic crisis.
2In the U.S. the number of workers paying into the pension program was 5.1 per retiree in 1960.
However, in 2007 the number decreased to 3.3. This is expected to further decrease to 2.1 by 2035. For the
details, see the 2010 annual report of the board of trustees of the federal old-age and survivors insurance
and federal disability insurance trust funds.
3Although some countries can access enough sovereign wealth funds which can be used to provide for
retirees, many other countries have substantial political economy constraints on the size of such a fund in
the long term, so their ability to fully pre-fund post-retirement financial resources can be limited.
4A major cut in pension benefits ahead took place in the U.S. on July 18, 2013, when the city of Detroit,
Michigan filed for Chapter 9 bankruptcy and consequently, proposed pension benefit cuts. A deal to cut
monthly pension benefits for thousands of retirees by 4.5% was unanimously endorsed by a Detroit pension
board on April 16, 2014. Other examples of bankruptcy in the U.S. include: Jefferson County, Alabama,
which filed for bankruptcy on November 9, 2011, and Stockton, California, which filed for Chapter 9
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We consider a retiree who participated in defined benefit (DB) pension plans and re-
ceives a defined life annuity that replaces a certain percentage of her last labor income.
We simply capture such uncertainty in annuity income by assuming that an unexpected,
large, and negative income shock occurs at a probability that follows an exponential dis-
tribution with positive intensity. Within a utility-maximizing framework, the retiree who
lives finitely has a standard constant relative risk aversion utility function. The retiree
encounters constant investment opportunities provided by one risk-free bond and one risky
stock in the financial market.
We solve the optimal consumption and investment problem in an incomplete market,
where borrowing constraints and insurer default risk are considered jointly. We derive in
closed-form the optimal consumption and investment strategies. We find two main results
by quantitative analysis.
• As insurer default risk increases, the proportion of wealth invested in stocks could
increase when wealth is low, and decrease when wealth is high.
• As risk aversion increases, the voluntary annuity demand could increase when insurer
default risk is small, and decrease when insurer default risk is large.
The decision to invest in the stock market is determined by two considerations: a
precautionary savings motive that decreases investment, and a risk diversification motive
that increases investment. We numerically verify the existence of a threshold level of
bankruptcy on June 28, 2012. In the UK, about 70 percent of defined benefit pension schemes have been
identified as deficits according to the Pension Protection Fund data.
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wealth below which the hedging demandH induced by risk diversification motive dominates
precautionary savings motive P , and above which P dominates H. Overall, a strategy of
reducing consumption and increasing savings is effective to accumulate wealth to prepare
for cuts in benefits.
The annuity-income-to-wealth-ratio (non-financial-income-to-wealth-ratio) is a driving
factor that underlies the investment portfolio. This ratio is inversely related to the wealth
of the retiree. The annuity is a major source of income for a relatively poor retiree, so
she should concern herself with diversifying insurer default risk by investing in the stock
market. In contrast, the annuity is a relatively smaller major source of income for a wealthy
retiree, so she has greater tolerance for insurer default risk than the poor retiree. Hence,
the wealthy retiree would rather be concerned with the effects of default risk. The disparity
of the income-to-wealth ratio between poor and rich is the leading cause of the differing
portfolio decisions.
To our best knowledge, only two papers have studied questions related to the effects of
potential benefit cuts on the behavior of retirees. Lopes and Michaelides (2007) conclude
that an assumption of high risk aversion for a rare event is necessary to change the an-
nuity demand of a retiree, but that high risk aversion itself increases the attractiveness of
defaultable annuities as insurance against longevity risk. In contrast, Babbel and Merrill
(2007) assert that participation in the annuity market may be low, especially when retirees
are exposed to the risk that annuity providers may default. Our paper is the first to rec-
oncile these seemingly contradictory conclusions. We show that if default risk is small, the
retiree’s voluntary annuity demand increases as her risk aversion increases; this inference
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is consistent with the findings of Lopes and Michaelides. We also find that if default risk
is large, the annuity demand decreases with risk aversion; this inference is compatible with
the findings of Babbel and Merrill. Overall, the decision to buy more or fewer annuities is
influenced, to a large extent, by the way in which large insurer default risk is conceptualized
and modelled.
This paper is related to a large body of strands in the literature that studies the
optimal consumption and investment in the presence of nontradable income. Since the
seminal paper of Yaari (1965), other researchers (e.g., Richard, 1975; Davidoff et al., 2005;
Park, 2015) have shown that the optimal strategy under an uncertain lifetime and in the
absence of bequest motive is to annuitize all wealth. Based on the optimal consumption
and portfolio choice of Merton (1969, 1971), Milevsky and Young (2007), Bayraktar et
al. (2009) have sought optimal strategies in an incomplete market, where income risk or
mortality/longevity risk cannot be fully diversified away; their results have supported the
conclusion that full annuitization is the optimal strategy.
Despite these theoretical predictions in complete or incomplete markets, the actual an-
nuity market is quite thin; this status gives rise to the so-called annuity puzzle. Numerous
authors have tried to resolve this puzzle. The market price of annuities is higher than their
actuarially fair price, as a consequence of adverse selection of annuity buyers (Mitchell et
al., 1999). A strong bequest motive of annuity buyers can generate low annuity demand
(Friedman and Warshawsky, 1990; Brown, 2001; Johnson et al., 2004). Inkmann et al.
(2011) thoroughly analyze the determinants of annuity demand by considering microeco-
nomic data for the United Kingdom. Individual characteristics and measures of investor
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sentiment can have a strong influence on the demand for life annuities (Chalmers and
Reuter, 2012). However, none of these studies investigate the effects of insurer default risk
on a retiree’s optimal consumption and investment strategies.
This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we describe our economic setting with
forced default events of life annuity and present a retiree’s optimization problem under
a continuous-time setup. In Section 3, we provide analytical results regarding optimal
strategies of the retiree. In Section 4, we explain main implications predicted by our
model; specifically, we analyze the effects of insurer default risk on the retiree’s optimal
consumption and risky investment strategies and voluntary annuity demand, and measure
the effects of insurer default risks by considering the certainty equivalent wealth. In Section
5, we check the robustness of the conclusions with respect to relaxing specific assumptions
about bequest motive, correlation between stock price and annuity default event, and
mortality rates. In Section 6, we conclude the paper.
2 Continuous-Time Model for Life Annuity with De-
fault Risk
2.1 Economic Setting
We consider the optimal consumption and portfolio selection problem of a retiree who has











where E is the expectation taken at time 0, ct is per-period consumption, τM is the time
of the retiree’s death, B is a strictly increasing and concave function representing the
retiree’s bequest motive, XτM is the retiree’s wealth at her death time, β > 0 is the
retiree’s subjective discount rate, and γ > 0 is her coefficient of relative risk aversion.5 We
assume that τM is distributed with intensity νs at instant s ≥ 0: for time t ≥ 0,




The retiree can trade securities. The securities market consists of two assets: a bond
(or a risk-free asset) and a stock (or a risky asset). The bond price Bt follows
dBt = rBtdt,
where r > 0 is the risk-free interest rate, and the stock price St evolves according to the
following geometric Brownian motion:
dSt = µStdt+ σStdWt,
where µ > r is the expected rate of the stock return, σ > 0 is the volatility of the return
on the stock, and Wt is a standard Brownian motion defined on an appropriate probability
space. We assume that r, µ, and σ are constant.
The retiree receives income at a rate equal to ε from life annuity, which she accumulated
during her pre-retirement period. We assume that sale of the annuity is prohibitively costly
5Throughout our analysis, we assume that γ > 1, which is empirically plausible based on the literature
(e.g., Farhi and Panageas, 2007; Dybvig and Liu, 2010).
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for the retiree, so she cannot reduce her annuitized income from the annuity in return for
an increase in financial wealth.6
We assume that the provider of the annuity is subject to default risk. The retiree can
receive a proportion 0 ≤ k < 1 of the income from the annuity if the provider defaults, so
she obtains income kε after the default event, which can be in part an annuitized payout
from a Social Security program or from the minimum subsistence provision of a public
welfare program.7 Default event of the annuity provider is driven by an exogenous shock,
for which the occurrence is distributed with intensity δs ≥ 0 at instant s ≥ 0; for time
t ≥ 0,




where τ stands for the default time of the annuity provider.8
We have two sources of risk: stock market risk (a Brownian motion) and insurer (an-
nuity provider) default risk (Poisson arrival of the default event).9 The market risk is
6In the presence of substantial transaction costs, no trading is typically optimal (Constantinides, 1986;
Liu and Loewenstein, 2002; Jang et al., 2007).
7The provision of minimum subsistence for the incomeless retiree supported by the government makes
sense in that it could turn out to be effective in building aggregate spending and smoothing consumption
over a lifetime.
8We model the default event as a jump process. Mortality, disability, retirement, unemployment, and
many other events that happen at an uncertain time have been considered by such jump process (Merton,
1971; Richard, 1975; Viceira, 2001). In this paper, the insurer’s default event also occurs at an uncertain
time, so that the default time τ evolving by an exponential distribution can appropriately represent this
uncertainty.
9Mortality also can be regarded as another source of risk in the presence of bequest motive, which will
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diversifiable by controlling the investment in the stock, whereas the default risk is un-
hedgeable and cannot be fully diversified away in the market. In this sense, we assume
that no financial vehicle (securities, financial contracts, or insurance contracts) is available
to hedge against the annuity provider’s default risk. Accordingly, the financial market
including the securities market and the insurance market is essentially incomplete.
2.2 The Retiree’s Optimization Problem with Insurer Default
Risk
We specify the retiree’s optimization problem in the presence of insurer default risk. After
a default of the annuity provider, we assume that the income from annuity is recovered
with the rate of k (0 ≤ k < 1). We assume for the moment that νs and δs are constant, the
insurer default risk is independent of the stock market risk, and there is no bequest motive
for simplicity of exposition, i.e., B(XτM ) = 0. We will relax this assumption in Section 5.


















Thus, the utility function is equal to that of an infinitely-lived person with her subjective
discount rate being increased by the mortality rate ν.
The retiree’s problem with initial endowment x before the default event is to maximize
her CRRA lifetime utility (1) by controlling per-period consumption c and risky investment
be further investigated in our robustness section.
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π. The problem leads to the following value function:























. In the right-hand side, δK (Xt+kε/r)
1−γ
1−γ
captures the retiree’s utility value after the default event, i.e., the term is equal to the
product of the default intensity δ and the maximized value of her utility after the rate of
income from annuity is reduced to kε.10
The last term in the right-hand side of (2) includes the default intensity δ. For the
limiting case of δ = 0, the retiree is not exposed to default risk, so she maximizes a function
of intermediate consumption (e.g., Merton, 1969, 1971). For the opposite extreme where
δ = +∞, the retiree’s problem is also trivial because the insurer’s default is immediate and
the rate of income is kε forever. In this case the problem reduces to the classical optimal
consumption and portfolio choice problem (e.g., Merton, 1969, 1971). Within the range
0 < δ < +∞ of plausible values, equation (2) shows that the insurer’s default risk leads to
a new interesting problem in which the retiree maximizes not only her consumption but
also intermediate wealth at the time of the insurer’s default.
The retiree who invests her savings in riskless and risky assets accumulates her wealth




rXt − ct + ε
)
dt+ πtσ(dWt + θdt), 0 ≤ t < τ ∧ τM ,(
rXt − ct + kε
)
dt+ πtσ(dWt + θdt), τ ∧ τM ≤ t ≤ τM ,
where π is the dollar amount invested in the stock, θ = (µ− r)/σ is the Sharpe ratio. The
retiree accumulates wealth at the rate (rX − c+ ε) before the insurer defaults, and at the
10For a detailed derivation of equation (2), we refer to Section 1 in Online Appendix.
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rate (rX − c + kε) after the default, if we do not account for her risk taking in the stock
market.
A wealth (or borrowing) constraint precludes an individual from using the full cap-
italized value of future income and arises due to market frictions such as informational
asymmetry, agency conflicts, and limited enforcement (Farhi and Panageas, 2007; Dybvig
and Liu, 2010, Jang et al., 2013). The insurer default risk is a source of market friction
consistent with such a constraint. We impose the nonnegative wealth constraint (or the
borrowing constraint)
Xt ≥ 0, 0 ≤ t < τ, (3)
which implies that the retiree cannot borrow against her future annuity income.
After the insurer defaults, we assume that the retiree could borrow up to the present





, t ≥ τ.
3 Optimal Consumption and Investment Strategies
The task of solving financial problems constructed in an incomplete market is an ex-
tremely complex one. Because of the non-uniqueness of an equivalent martingale measure,
a closed-form solution of the problems cannot be found. To solve the optimal consumption
and portfolio choice problem in such an incomplete market, we use a new convex-duality
method (Bensoussan et al., 2016). We develop a dynamic programming approach by using
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a modified convex-dual function G of the original value function V . If we set
























for 0 < λ < λ, where λ is a free boundary to be determined by the nonnegative wealth
constraint (3).
Next, we derive explicitly the retiree’s optimal consumption and investment strategies
and discuss their properties.11
Theorem 3.1 We define P ≡ insurer-default-risk-induced precautionary savings and its
first term P1 and its second terms P2 as:
P ≡ P1 + P2
=
2δK(αδ − 1)



































11In Online Appendix, the details of deriving optimal strategies with insurer default risk are provided.
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where B(λ; δ) is a constant to be determined according to the value-matching and smooth-
pasting conditions. The two constants αδ > 1 and −1 < α∗δ < 0 are the roots of the
following characteristic equation:
F (α; δ) = −1
2
θ2α(α− 1) + α(β + ν + δ − r) + r = 0.
Proof. See online Appendix.
Optimal Consumption Strategy with Insurer Default Risk
When δ = 0, i.e., default risk is zero, optimal consumption given by equation (4) is
equal to the one obtained from the classical problem in the presence of the nonnegative







−B(λ; δ = 0)λ∗(x)−α∗0
}
. (6)
Most importantly, the effects of default risk on optimal consumption are revealed by the
extra term of P = insurer-default-risk-induced precautionary savings in the right-hand side
12
of equation (4). The precautionary savings motive against uninsurable income risk plays a
central and unifying role in the current analysis of buffer-stock savings behaviors (Wang et
al., 2016). An important argument related to the precautionary savings motive is that the
borrowing-constrained retiree facing insurer default risk is likely to reduce consumption to
increase additional reserves in a precautionary way or to finance current consumption by
using her savings. More specifically, insurer-default-risk-induced precautionary savings (P )
are divided into two terms: the first term of precautionary savings (P1) can be thought
of as a resource that is used to finance consumption and thus, results in an increase in
consumption; the second term (P2) can be thought of as precautionary savings that results
in a decrease in consumption. In particular, the incentives to increase precautionary savings
to finance consumption get stronger as the retiree’s wealth gets smaller and at the extreme
case of wealth close to zero,
P → 2δK(αδ − 1)λ
−αδ











dµ < 0 as x→ 0.
Naturally, the incentives to finance consumption become weaker as the retiree accumulates
wealth, and in the extreme case of sufficiently large wealth,
P → 0 as x→∞,
which implies that for the wealthy retiree, consumption can be sustained comfortably even
in the event of insurer default.
Optimal Investment Strategy with Insurer Default Risk
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Setting δ = 0 in the right-hand side of (5), we can derive the optimal investment in the
















B(λ; δ = 0)λ∗(x)−α
∗
0 . (7)
The nonnegative wealth constraint tends to decrease investment in a risky asset; this
trend is represented by the second term of the right-hand side of (7). The intuition behind
this is very simple: the borrowing-constrained retiree is inclined to decrease risky exposure
and increase riskless asset holdings to avoid binding borrowing constraints in the future;
this trend gets stronger as the retiree’s wealth gets smaller.
More interestingly, the effects of default risk on risky investment are not always obvious,
but rather are non-monotonic in the magnitude of the risk, depending on levels of financial
wealth. We emphasize that the retiree can partially hedge against uninsurable insurer
default risk by investing in the stock, and this hedging demand for the stock can increase
as the insurer default risk increases, especially when retiree’s wealth is small. As a result,
endogenous adjustments of risky investment can have an effect on future consumption.
Indeed, the third term of the right-hand side of (5) represents such hedging demand to
reserve resources available for future consumption in the face of insurer default risk, and
in turn results in an increase in stock investment to take advantage of the positive risk












is the ratio of the retiree’s utility value after the default event to the utility value from
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optimal consumption.12 Increase in risk associated with the income stream from annuities
(or increase in insurer default intensity δ) increases the hedging demand which provides
motive to diversify and to accumulate wealth faster. In particular, the hedging demand
































The precautionary savings motive against insurer default risk is also a crucial element
when the retiree invests in the risky asset. Our optimal investment rule (5) in the risky
asset shows analytically that the amount of investment decreases by proportions of insurer-













γ of the second term of insurer-default-risk-induced precautionary
savings (P2) are saved in the form of the riskless asset. This precautionary savings motive


















γ × 2δK(αδ − 1)













dµ as x→ 0.
The combined effects indicate that the retiree’s level of wealth affects her optimal
investment in the stock in the presence of insurer default risk. An important observation









which is from the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation given in the online Appendix.
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here is the possibility of a threshold level of wealth below which the hedging demand H
that increases equity demand dominates the precautionary savings motive P that decreases
equity demand, and above which P dominates H, which will be verified in our quantitative
analysis in the next section.
4 Numerical Illustrations
In this section, we obtain numerical solutions and present graphical illustrations to provide
details to the discussion regarding optimal strategies. For this purpose, we use an iterative
numerical procedure (online Appendix). We calibrate asset returns following the important
life-cycle models (Cocco et al., 2005; Farhi and Panageas, 2007; Dybvig and Liu, 2010). We
set the equity premium to 6%, which is the historical average value. We set the bond return
to 2%, because the recent interest rates are very low, and set the stock volatility to 20%.
We set the annual rate of annuity payments to be 1, i.e., ε = 1, and the retiree’s expected
lifetime to be 20 years, or equivalently, ν = 0.05. We set the subjective discount factor
β = 0.04 (Cocco et al., 2005). We also assume that the relative risk aversion coefficient
γ = 4.13
Default intensity δ is calibrated based on Moody’s (2012) historical data of average
cumulative issuer-weighted global default rates by rating categories for the time period
13The portfolio choice literature regarding the life-cycle model uses the standard and moderate relative
risk aversion coefficient. For instance, Farhi and Panageas (2007) consider a range of values from 2 to 4
for this coefficient, and Dybvig and Liu (2010) set γ = 3 for the baseline parameter value. Cocco et al.
(2005) use the upper bound for risk aversion of γ = 10.
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from 1983 to 2011. Similarly, Lopes and Michaelides (2007) and Babbel and Merrill (2007)
use corporate debt ratings by a credit rating agent like Moody’s to estimate default prob-
ability of life annuities. The statistics related to federal, state, municipal and other local
governments are not available in sufficiently credible quantities, so Moody’s historical data
on corporate defaults is used to calibrate the insurer default intensity δ. A deterioration
of corporate credit rating constitutes major risks to life insurers (Impavido and Tower,
2009). We select four categories, Aaa, Aa, A, and B, to calibrate the default intensity. It
is calibrated as follows: 0.0001 for Aaa, 0.0012 for Aa, 0.0030 for A, 0.0526 for B.
In the U.S. the NOLHGA and its state government members provide retired people
with minimum benefit guarantees by recovering parts of remaining benefits after default
of annuity providers. The coverage limit for most of states is $100, 000 in withdrawal and
cash values for annuities. As a result, the rest of the coverage exceeding the coverage limit
is recovered according to the liquidation ratio, which is the amount of assets available in
the insolvent estate. Therefore, we regard the recovery rate as the recovery amount of the
excess claim. We take three values of the recovery rate k of the excess claim to be 30%,
40%, and 50%.14
4.1 Optimal Consumption and Investment in the Risky Asset
Figure 2 displays the retiree’s optimal consumption ratio and investment ratio in the risky
asset as a function of initial wealth for different levels of default risk when the recovery
rate k equals to 0.3, i.e., the recovery amount is 30% of the excess claim. As expected,
14Babbel and Merrill (2007) consider a range of values from 0% to 25% for the recovery rate.
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the optimal consumption ratio decreases as wealth or default risk increases. These findings
are consistent with the standard life-cycle models (Cocco et al., 2005; Polkovnichenko,
2007) in that the presence of default risk of life annuity, i.e., income risk constitutes the
precautionary savings motive.
[Insert Figure 2 here.]
An important implication of this paper is that the effects of the insurer’s default risk
on portfolio policies vary with a change in the retiree’s wealth. The portfolio share in the
risky asset increases as default risk increases when the retiree’s wealth is small, whereas the
portfolio share decreases with default risk when the retiree’s wealth is large. In summary,
a threshold level of wealth exists, below which the portfolio share increases as default risk
increases and above which it decreases as default risk increases.
An increase in default risk of a life annuity has two possibly counteracting effects on the
retiree’s optimal portfolio choice. First, the increase results in an increase in background
risk,15 so precaution will encourage the retiree to become increasingly conservative; i.e., as
the riskinesss of the retiree’s income increases, the investment in the risky asset decreases.
Second, a defaultable annuity also is a risky asset, so the retiree has no choice but to
resort to higher-yielding alternatives by aggressive investment in the stock market. The
prices of high-risk investments are adjusted to increase their expected returns, and a rise
in default risk can be partially spanned by investing in the stock market in a search for a
15The background risk is an undiversifiable risk that affects an economic agent’s portfolio choice. Typical
examples of background risk are income risk and risk of house ownership (Bodie et al., 1992; Heaton and
Lucas, 1997; Koo, 1998).
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positive risk premium, which is ultimately induced by risk diversification purposes. As a
result, the share of wealth in the risky asset can increase with an increase in default risk if
the diversification motive dominates the precautionary savings motive; whereas the share
or wealth invested in the risky asset can decrease with an increase in default risk if the
diversification motive is dominated by the precautionary savings motive.
The annuity-income-to-wealth-ratio (non-financial-income-to-wealth-ratio) is inversely
related to the retiree’s wealth. The annuity is a major staple of the relatively poor retiree
and she should concern herself with diversifying the default risk by investing in the stock
market. In contrast, the annuity is a relatively smaller staple of the rich retiree, so she has
greater tolerance for risk than the poor retiree, and therefore is primarily concerned with
the effects of background risk itself. The disparity of the income-to-wealth ratio between
poor and rich is the root cause of their different portfolio decisions.
Changes in Recovery Rate
Optimal consumption and investment in the risky asset depend on recovery rates and
default intensities (Table 1). As recovery rate of the life annuity increases or as the annuity
provider’s credit rating increases, the retiree increases her consumption. For instance, due
to the precarious financial condition of the annuity provider, the optimal consumption ratio
decreases from 18.88% to 17.80% if the credit rating decreases from A to B, for the case
where k = 0.5 and x = 10.
Interestingly, the default risk differently affects the retiree’s optimal portfolio choice,
and the difference is affected by the recovery rate. This also is a manifestation of the two
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opposing effects of default risk that bring to the portfolio share. The retiree can be likely
to become either increasingly aggressive or increasingly conservative when investing in the
stock market in the event of incoming insurer default. Suppose a sharp decline in the credit
rating of the annuity provider from A to B and a moderate amount x = 10 of initial wealth.
If the retiree can recover 30% of her annuity income if her insurer defaults, her optimal risky
investment should decrease from 111.37% to 107.94%. However, if she can recover 50% of
her annuity income if the insurer defaults, her optimal risky investment should increase
from 110.82% to 124.36%. The precautionary savings motive that decreases investment
and the risk diversification motive that increases investment are somewhat counterbalanced
by the recovery rate.16
[Insert Table 1 here.]
Changes in Risk Aversion
Changes in risk aversion affect the optimal strategy (Figure 3). For simplicity, we
assume that the retiree has a small amount of wealth, for instance her initial endowment
is 5. Reduced risk aversion leads the retiree to increase her consumption ratio and increase
16These two opposing effects on investment also have an influence on consumption. In Table 1, for the
case where k = 0.5 and x = 1, it seems that the consumption ratio increases with increase in default
risk δ, contrary to another case where k = 0.3 and k = 0.4 for the same wealth level x = 1. Given the
dominance of the risk diversification motive over the precautionary savings motive, such an increase in
consumption could be achieved with the help of both a high recovery rate and an increased compensation
for investment in the stock. This result might imply that the retiree can partially hedge against the default
risk by investing in the risky asset and thus in some cases, increase consumption as default risk increases.
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the investment ratio in the risky asset, irrespective of the extent of insurer default risk.
However, the effects of insurer default risk crucially depend on both the extent of the
default risk and the degree of risk aversion. For retirees with low risk aversion, the default
risk is most likely to be negligible, so that their optimal strategies become increasingly
dependent on the degree of risk aversion, ceteris paribus, unless the default event is soon to
come, for example if the credit rating of the annuity provider is B. In contrast, retirees with
high risk aversion perceives the default risk intensely, so their optimal behaviors tend to be
independent of the degree of risk aversion, even for a moderate default risk. Summarizing,
the default risk of life annuities has a large impact on the retiree’s optimal consumption
and investment decisions, especially for the highly risk-averse retiree.
[Insert Figure 3 here.]
Changes in Investment Opportunity
The investment opportunity affects the retiree’s optimal choices of consumption (Table
2) and investment (Table 3). As expected, the retiree is willing to increase consumption
and increase investment in the risky asset if the investment opportunity improves, or
equivalently, if the expected return on the risky asset is high or the volatility of the return
is low, or both.
[Insert Table 2 and 3 here.]
The retiree might drastically reduce her consumption ratio in the face of high default
risk (Table 2). For example, when the retiree has initial wealth 10, and the credit rating
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of the insurance company changes from A to B, the consumption declines from 17.53%
to 17.05% when expected rate of stock return is 7%, but from 13.46% to 12.83% when
the expected rate of stock return is 6%. Reduction in consumption due to an increase in
default risk increases in significance as the investment opportunity worsens.
For a fixed amount of wealth, the retiree’s investment ratio can increase or decrease
with insurer default risk, depending on whether the market is up or down (Table 3). For
instance, when the credit rating of the annuity provider declines from A to B, the retiree
with initial wealth of 10 increases her investment ratio in the risky asset from 73.44% to
90.64% if volatility of the risky asset is 21%, but decreases her investment ratio from 67.32%
to 59.98% if the volatility is 22%. When the market is increasing, stock investment becomes
attractive because the resulting positive risk premium improves the retiree’s wealth when
she diversifies the default risk. However, when the market is decreasing, the effectiveness
of hedging with the stock investment is also reduced, so the default risk can mean that the
retiree’s optimal strategy is to increase her savings.
4.2 Annuity Demand with Insurer Default Risk
In this section, we calculate the actuarially fair price and the retiree’s implicit value of life
annuity, and compare these two values. The implicit value of life annuity is the marginal
rate of substitution between annuity holdings and financial wealth (Koo, 1998), so it is the
retiree’s subjectively perceived value of her annuity holdings, i.e., her reservation price of
an annuity when she is offered to purchase or sell a small amount of it. This implicit value
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is a proxy for the retiree’s annuity demand; a higher value than the market price implies
that the retiree would be willing to buy it and a lower value than the market price implies
that she would be willing to sell it if she were given an opportunity to do so.
The actuarially fair price serves as a benchmark to set the market price by the annuity








r + ν + δ
,
and, for comparison purposes, we define the benchmark price as the actuarially fair price
without the default risk (i.e., δ = 0). We introduce the definition of the implicit value of
life annuity.
Definition 4.1 Let us denote the value function defined in (2) by V (x, ε, δ), which is a
function of initial wealth x, rate ε of income from the annuity, and default intensity δ.
Then the implicit value of life annuity is defined by
∂V (x, ε, δ)
∂ε
/∂V (x, ε, δ)
∂x
.
The implicit value of life annuity increases as the amount of wealth increases, regardless
of insurer default risk (Figure 4). This trend implies that the retiree is interested in taking
an increasing share of the life annuity as her wealth increases. Inkmann et al. (2011) make
a similar finding; this agreement suggests that annuities are attractive to rich retirees.
However, if insurer default risk is high (i.e., credit rating B), the implicit value can decrease
below the benchmark price.17 Accordingly, an imminent insurer default could help explain
17In this aspect, when studying annuity demand, the implicit value corresponding to the high default
rate (i.e., credit rating B) would be another benchmark, in addition to the actuarially fair price.
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the low level of annuitization.
[Insert Figure 4 here.]
Changes in Recovery Rate
The implicit value of life annuity varies with the recovery rate (Figure 5). The level of
recovery rate does not appear to affect the implicit value if the insurance provider has a
good credit rating. However, when incoming insurer default is possible, such as a credit
rating of B, then an increase in the recovery rate looks likely to be able to increase the
implicit value, and thereby reduce the demand for selling or refunding life annuities.
[Insert Figure 5 here.]
Changes in Risk Aversion
Lopes and Michaelides (2007) arguably state that the low annuity take-up in the actual
annuity market cannot be explained by the possibility of rare events, like default of the
annuity provider. The retiree must have high risk aversion before a rare event can change
her annuity demand, but high risk aversion on its own drives the retiree to purchase
additional annuities as insurance against mortality risk. In contrast, Babbel and Merrill
(2007) demonstrate that participation in the annuity market could be reduced considerably
as retirees encounter default risk of annuity providers. We show that if default risk is small,
the retiree’s voluntary annuity demand increases as her risk aversion increases; this result
is consistent with the finding of Lopes and Michaelides. We also identify that if default risk
is large, the annuity demand decreases as risk aversion increases; this result is compatible
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with the finding of Babbel and Merrill. Overall, the choice of quantity of annuities to buy
is strongly influenced by the way in which large insurer default risk is conceptualized and
modeled.
Increased risk aversion drives retirees to increase the amounts of annuities that they
purchase when they are faced with moderate insurer default risk (e.g., case Aaa, Figure
6); this result is consistent with Lopes and Michaelides (2007). However, this result can
be reversed when insurance providers are on the brink of default (e.g., case B, Figure 6).
In this case, the voluntary annuity demand decreases as risk aversion increases, and this
conclusion is consistent with Babbel and Merrill (2007).
The function of a life annuity provides an intuitive explanation for why the relation
between the retiree’s voluntary annuity demand and her risk aversion varies with the
extent of insurer default risk. Traditionally, a life annuity has been regarded as riskless
bond holdings; as a result, the retiree’s inclination to invest in the annuity market increases
as her risk aversion increases; the purpose is to hedge against the risk that the retiree will
outlive her financial resources. However, defaultable annuities are no longer effective as
hedging tools against this longevity risk. Rather, defaultable annuities themselves appear
to be implicitly risky, like those risky equity holdings. Accordingly, the willingness to
reduce investment in the annuity market increases as the retiree’s risk aversion increases.
[Insert Figure 6 here.]
Changes in Investment Opportunity
The implicit value of the life annuity changes with investment opportunity (Table 4).
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When the default risk is low, the implicit value rises if the investment opportunity degrades,
and subsequently, life annuity becomes increasingly attractive to retirees as the stock mar-
ket tends to decline; this conclusion is consistent with Chalmers and Reuter (2012) and
Previtero (2014). However, an increase in insurer default risk (e.g., for the credit ratings
Aa, A, and B) can cause the opposite result: the attractiveness of life annuity to retirees
decreases even with increased probability that market will decline; this conclusion is con-
trary to common intuition. The counterintuitive trend occurs because defaultable annuities
are no longer safe assets and retirees should concern themselves so much with focusing on
the negative effect of imminent insurer default; consequently, they are willing to reduce
their investment in the annuity market, to avoid worrying about additional sources of risk.
[Insert Table 4 here.]
4.3 Certainty Equivalent Wealth Gain from Considering Insurer
Default Risk
Now, we analyze the economic significance of clearly incorporating insurer default risk.
As an example, suppose a retiree has no insurer default risk, i.e., the life annuity is free
of default risk. After taking this consideration, another retiree who is faced with insurer
default risk is likely to pay additional money to make her life annuity default-free. We
compute the certainty wealth gain (CEWG) as the dollar amount of initial endowment of
the retiree as a result of correctly considering the insurer default risk. The CEWG is a kind
of compensation for the retiree in return for bearing the default risk of annuity provider. We
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discuss the various properties of CEWG under changes in fundamental parameter values.
Definition 4.2 ∆(x) is called the certainty equivalent wealth gain at wealth level x if it
satisfies
V (x−∆(x), ε, 0) = V (x, ε, δ).
CEWG is a decreasing function of the retiree’s initial wealth (Figure 7), because the
retiree’s ability to manage insurer default risk is increased as her wealth increases; i.e.,
wealth itself can be used as a buffer to absorb the default risk.18 Moreover, the CEWG
increases as default risk increases. Retirees should be so fixated on exposing the current
displeasing traits of their defaultable life annuities, as a result, they are entitled to this large
compensation. This finding strongly supports the economic importance of considering the
insurer default risk when the retiree is consuming and investing in the stock and annuity
markets.
[Insert Figure 7 here.]
Changes in Recovery Rate
CEWG is sensitive to changes in the recovery rate (Figure 8). As expected, as the
retiree’s recovery rate after insurer default increases, her entitlement to compensation
decreases.
18The CEWG converges to zero as wealth approaches infinity. The retiree who is exposed to insurer
default risk cannot expect for sure how much or how long exactly benefits will be provided from her
defaultable life annuities over her remaining lifetime. No retiree can have zero CEWG unless her amount
of wealth is infinite.
27
[Insert Figure 8 here.]
Changes in Risk Aversion
The CEWG increases as the retiree’s risk aversion increases (Figure 9). Obviously, an
increase in risk aversion is likely to increase the pressure on the retiree to manage insurer
default risk. An increase in insurer default risk further decreases disposable annuity income;
this change results in increased compensation to mitigate the insurer default risk (e.g., B
vs. Aaa, Aa, or A).
[Insert Figure 9 here.]
Changes in Investment Opportunity
CEWG is sensitive to changes in expected stock return µ and stock volatility σ (Table
5). When the market is low, i.e., when µ is low, or σ is high, or both, retirees who are free
of insurer default risk achieve substantial CEWGs. The gain resulting from behavior that
correctly takes into account the default risk of life annuities can be an order of magnitude,
especially during a decreasing stock market.
[Insert Table 5 here.]
5 General Case and Robustness
In this section, we will show that our main results do not change by the simplifying as-
sumptions that the retiree has no bequest motive, that the correlation between the risky
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asset price and the default event of the insurance provide is zero, and that mortality rate
ν is constant.
The bequest motive is that the retired person would like to bequeath part of her wealth
to heirs at death. This can further decrease the annuity take-up by the retiree. This con-
clusion has been established by many other studies (e.g., Friedman and Warshawsky, 1990;
Brown, 2001; Johnson et al., 2004). The addition of the bequest motive only reinforced
our conclusion.
Next, we consider a non-zero correlation between the risky asset price and default
intensity, and examine the effect of this correlation on the voluntary annuity demand (or
equivalently, the implicit value of life annuity). Throughout this section, we assume that
the risky asset considered in our model is a well-diversified portfolio such as a worldwide
stock index, so the price fluctuation of the risky asset depends only on a systematic risk
factor. To impose a non-zero correlation between the systematic risk factor and the default
risk of annuity provider, we use a stochastic process δs (Blanchet-Scalliet et al., 2008) as a
time-varying default intensity;19 for time t ≥ 0,




satisfying, for time t ≥ 0,
dδs = aδsds+ bδsdW
∗
s , δ0 = δ > 0, a < 0, b > 0,
19The process, δs, of Blanchet-Scalliet et al. (2008) might not satisfy
∫∞
0
δsds ≤ 1. Nonetheless, this
time-varying default probability is helpful to demonstrate repercussions in the simplest possible setting.
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where W ∗s is a standard Browninan motion such that
dWs · dW ∗s = ρds, for ρ ∈ [−1, 1].
Finally, we consider the case that the probability of the retiree’s mortality changes over
time. We take into account the following time-varying mortality rate, νt; for time t ≥ 0,




satisfying, for time t ≥ 0,
dνs = ãνsds+ b̃νsdW̃s, ν0 = ν > 0, ã < 0, b̃ > 0,





We can confirm the result obtained previously (Friedman and Warshawsky, 1990; Brown,
2001; Johnson et al., 2004) that the retiree’s voluntary annuity demand decreases with
20Letting a = −δ (ã = −ν), and b = 0 (b̃ = 0), the time of default, τ , (the time of death, τM ) follows a
simple exponential distribution with intensity δ (ν, respectively) as the following:
dδs = −δδsds, and dνs = −ννsds,
or equivalently,
δs = δe
−δs, and νs = νe
−νs.
Accordingly, the probabilities of default and death are derived as
Probaility of {τ ≤ t} =
∫ t
0
δe−δsds = 1− e−δt,
Probability of {τM ≤ t} =
∫ t
0
νe−νsds = 1− e−νt,
reducing the case with constant default intensity δ and constant mortality rate ν.
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the bequest motive k̃ (Table 6). The implicit value of life annuity decreases as the credit
rating of annuity providers decreases, regardless of k̃. An increase in k̃ decreases disposable
annuity payments, and thereby decreases the value of annuity holdings. Instead, the retiree
can increase the amount of wealth that they bequeath to her heirs.
[Insert Table 6 here.]
5.2 Correlation between Stock Price and Annuity Default Event
The implicit values of A-rated and B-rated life annuities vary with changes in the correla-
tion ρ between the risky asset price and default intensity δ of life annuity (Table 7). When
insurer default risk is negligible, implicit values of life annuities are lower when ρ = 20%
than when ρ = −20% whereas when insurer default risk is significant, the implicit values
of life annuities are higher when ρ = 20% than when ρ = −20%. The market risk can
be partially spanned by the annuity market: if the positive correlation is concerned, the
effectiveness of hedging with life annuities is reduced; whereas if the negative correlation is
considered, the effectiveness of hedging with life annuities is increased. Thus the spanning
of the market risk may be one of the most important factors when investing in the annuity
market. However, the spanning is an order of magnitude smaller than the damage caused
by insurer default. If retirees expect a very high insurer default risk, an investment in an-
nuities is not optimal, even if the correlation is negative. The extremely low implicit value
of B-rated life annuity is an accurate representation of how retirees perceive defaultable
life annuities.
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[Insert Table 7 here.]
5.3 Time-Varying Mortality Rates
As the standard deviation on mortality rates b̃ increases, the implicit value of life annuity
decreases for insurance providers that have good credit ratings such as Aaa, Aa, A (Table
8). The advantage of a life annuity is that it hedges against uncertain life expectancy, but
this advantage is offset by the uncertainty that is imposed by time variation in mortality
rate. However, this result might not be the case if we included insurers that are more at
risk of finding themselves in bankruptcy than are firms that have Aaa, Aa, and A credit
ratings. Indeed, the implicit value increases with the standard deviation for an insurer that
has a bad credit rating such as B. Even though insurers are at imminent risk of default,
annuity income that turns out to be defaultable still allows retirees to finance current and
future consumption, and thereby to mitigate problems that result from fluctuations in
mortality rates.
One can predict for sure what insurer default means to retirees by concluding that the
voluntary annuity demand will shrink as the perceived risks of insurer default increases,
regardless of temporal variation in mortality rates.
[Insert Table 8 here.]
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6 Conclusion
We have derived an optimal portfolio choice for a retired person who has partially annu-
itized her wealth and is in danger of being caught up in insurer default. We have shown
that the effects of default risk on the retiree’s optimal asset allocation among the bond,
stock, and annuity markets depend crucially on the level of default risk, risk aversion, and
wealth. We hope that this paper lends itself to the study of both policy design and the
basis of financial advice, especially for low-income retirees who are particularly vulnerable
to annuity income risks.
Further work should increase the realism of the financial market to allow time variations
and potential jumps in investment opportunity, and a comprehensively review of causes of
insurer default.
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Appendix: The Details of State Guaranty Associations
A number of insurance companies have experienced substantial losses in economic down-
turns and a few of them even filed for bankruptcy. In the U.S. insurance companies such
as Executive Life Insurance Co., First Capital Life Insurance Co., Monarch Life Insurance
Co. failed after 1990, and the AIG Group underwent a liquidity crisis on 2008 and received
a substantial government bailout of $85 billion, which is the largest government bailout of
a private company. In the United Kingdom National Assurance Co., English and American
Insurance Co., Oaklife Assurance Co., and Equitable Life, the world’s oldest life insurer,
became insolvent in 1980s and 1990s. In the Netherlands, the ING Group received a 10
billion euro capital injection and Aegon a billion euro recapitalization fund during the 2008
global crisis.
However, in the U.S. and many other jurisdictions there are guarantee funds including
state guaranty associations, so that individuals are possible to diversify default risks of
insurance companies. While the maximum coverage limits vary from state to state, most
states offer $100, 000 coverage in withdrawal and cash values for annuities. Actually, in
case the claim of a policyholder exceeds the guaranty association coverage, the recovery
amount of her excess claim depends highly on the liquidation ratio for the insolvency.
It is a common misunderstanding that policyholder recoveries in insurance liq-
uidations are limited to guaranty association coverage limits or “caps.” The
truth is that whether a policyholder recovers all or most of her claim above guar-
34
anty association caps depends significantly on whether regulatory intervention
occurs before the failed company’s assets have been substantially dissipated,
and whether assets are effectively protected and marshaled in the company’s
receivership (Source: NOLHGA, 2011).
As the excerpt from the NOLHGA (2011) demonstrates, the recovery amount of the
claim exceeding guaranty association limits depends crucially on the liquidation ratio for
the insolvency of insurance company. Consider a policyholder who has a claim of $1
million. Firstly, we suppose that there is no guaranty association protection. When the
life annuity defaults and the liquidation ratio is 95%, the policyholder recovers $950, 000
of the $1 million claim. However, if the liquidation ratio is zero, then the policyholder
recovers nothing (Figure 10).
[Insert Figure 10 here.]
For the next, we consider a case of guaranty association limit is $100, 000. Of course, the
policyholder recovers all of the claim within $100, 000 when insurance company defaults.
However, because she has a claim of $1 million, the recovery amount of the excess claim
is determined according to the liquidation ratio. If we assume that the liquidation ratio is
95%, then the policyholder recovers $855, 000 of the excess claim of $900, 000. Hence, the
amount of total recovery becomes $955, 000 ($100, 000 plus $855, 000). However, when the
liquidation ratio is 0%, then the excess claim is not recovered at all (Figure 10).
Finally, we suppose that the guaranty association cap is $250, 000. If the liquidation
ratio is 95%, then the recovery amount of the excess claim for the policyholder is $712, 500.
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As a result, the total recovery for the policyholder is $962, 000 ($250, 000 plus $712, 500).
Note that even if the guaranty association cap is 2.5 times larger as we compared to the
previous $100, 000, the total recovery increases a little, which is $7, 500. Furthermore, if the
liquidation ratio is zero, then the policyholder bears a very large loss of $750, 000 (Figure
10). Accordingly, the excess claim is recovered by not the level of guaranty association
limit, but the liquidation ratio.
According to the recent 2012 report of Moody’s, the average “firm-wide” liquidation
ratio for the 10 default resolutions was 53.4% in 2011. Here, the firm-wide rate represents
the weighted-average recovery rate across all of the issuer’s debts in which the weights are
the size of the debts. As we compared to 63.0% for 64 companies defaulted in 2010, the
lower liquidation rate of 53.4% is induced by the ultimate resolutions for more than 1,000
default events in 2011. Hence, in the insolvencies claims on life annuities have been paid
at a significant level.
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µ = 0.06 µ = 0.07
x \ δ Aaa Aa A B Aaa Aa A B
1 117.31 115.56 112.85 86.81 116.40 114.99 112.80 89.88
3 45.63 44.59 43.13 32.27 45.66 44.83 43.64 33.71
5 30.40 29.58 28.48 21.19 30.58 29.92 29.01 22.21
7 23.61 22.92 22.02 16.42 23.85 23.29 22.53 17.22
10 18.35 17.78 17.05 12.83 18.61 18.14 17.53 13.46
20 11.85 11.48 11.03 8.59 12.13 11.82 11.42 9.02
(A) expected rate of return µ
σ = 0.21 σ = 0.22
x \ δ Aaa Aa A B Aaa Aa A B
1 117.50 115.70 112.89 89.87 117.68 115.82 112.93 85.81
3 45.63 44.56 43.05 33.71 45.64 44.54 42.97 31.80
5 30.37 29.53 28.39 22.21 30.35 29.48 28.31 20.87
7 23.58 22.86 21.93 17.22 23.55 22.81 21.85 16.17
10 18.30 17.72 16.97 13.46 18.27 17.66 16.90 12.63
20 11.80 11.42 10.96 9.02 11.76 11.37 10.91 8.46
(B) volatility σ
Table 2: Optimal consumption ratio ct/x (%) as a function of initial wealth x for
changes in expected stock return µ and stock volatility σ. The relation between
a retiree’s optimal consumption choice and the investment opportunity is revealed in this
table. Baseline parameter values are set as follows: r = 0.02, β = 0.04, γ = 4, ε = 1,
ν = 0.05, and k = 0.3.
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µ = 0.06 µ = 0.07
x \ δ Aaa Aa A B Aaa Aa A B
1 235.26 248.71 268.86 381.35 277.80 289.05 305.81 423.38
3 138.15 144.80 153.14 172.56 164.13 169.95 177.59 205.63
5 108.48 112.33 116.49 117.22 129.42 132.94 137.09 143.64
7 92.82 95.10 97.15 91.96 111.11 113.29 115.57 114.05
10 79.01 79.95 80.42 72.67 94.95 95.95 96.73 90.64
20 58.84 58.29 57.34 49.83 71.33 70.92 70.16 62.17
(A) expected rate of return µ
σ = 0.21 σ = 0.22
x \ δ Aaa Aa A B Aaa Aa A B
1 215.62 228.75 248.51 423.38 198.29 211.07 230.39 329.89
3 126.48 132.92 140.96 205.63 116.20 122.43 130.16 144.97
5 99.23 102.94 106.87 143.64 91.10 94.67 98.39 97.11
7 84.85 87.03 88.93 114.05 77.86 79.93 81.69 75.83
10 72.18 73.05 73.44 90.64 66.19 67.01 67.32 59.98
20 53.66 53.13 52.19 62.17 49.14 48.61 47.70 41.24
(B) volatility σ
Table 3: Optimal risky investment ratio πt/x (%) as a function of initial wealth
x for changes in expected stock return µ and stock volatility σ. The relation
between a retiree’s optimal portfolio choice and the investment opportunity is revealed in
this table. Baseline parameter values are set as follows: r = 0.02, β = 0.04, γ = 4, ε = 1,
ν = 0.05, and k = 0.3.
43
µ = 0.06 µ = 0.07
x \ δ Aaa Aa A B Aaa Aa A B
1 15.92 14.84 13.32 5.8013 14.84 13.96 12.75 5.56
3 19.81 17.86 15.45 6.4035 18.61 17.06 15.10 5.89
5 22.30 19.61 16.66 6.3582 20.90 18.86 16.43 6.16
10 26.54 22.52 18.76 5.9268 24.72 21.85 18.66 6.78
20 30.93 26.05 21.64 4.9828 29.08 25.40 21.50 7.67
30 33.14 28.39 23.73 3.9411 31.75 27.69 23.50 8.36
(A) expected rate of return µ
σ = 0.21 σ = 0.22
x \ δ Aaa Aa A B Aaa Aa A B
1 16.18 15.01 13.42 5.58 16.37 15.15 13.51 5.74
3 20.11 18.01 15.51 6.32 20.32 18.13 15.55 7.01
5 22.48 19.74 16.69 6.26 22.70 19.85 16.71 6.30
10 26.40 22.62 18.76 6.48 26.64 22.72 18.77 6.15
20 30.85 26.15 21.65 7.97 31.10 26.24 21.65 8.28
30 33.56 28.50 23.77 8.47 33.80 28.60 23.79 8.40
(B) volatility σ
Table 4: Implicit value of life annuity as a function of initial wealth x for changes
in expected stock return µ and stock volatility σ. The table shows how the implicit
value changes with the investment opportunity, for different levels of default intensity δ.
Baseline parameter values are set as follows: r = 0.02, β = 0.04, γ = 4, ε = 1, ν = 0.05,
and k = 0.3.
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µ = 0.06 µ = 0.07
x \ δ Aaa Aa A B Aaa Aa A B
1 5.81 62.33 134.14 625.32 4.32 47.28 103.95 529.97
10 1.44 15.01 31.07 102.08 1.12 11.93 25.37 93.81
20 0.92 9.53 19.75 70.62 0.73 7.76 16.50 64.99
30 0.68 7.05 14.62 54.27 0.55 5.83 12.41 50.18
40 0.53 5.59 11.61 44.20 0.44 4.68 9.97 41.07
50 0.46 4.62 9.61 37.35 0.35 3.93 8.32 34.86
(A) expected rate of return µ
σ = 0.21 σ = 0.22
x \ δ Aaa Aa A B Aaa Aa A B
1 3.42 37.88 84.59 463.56 3.73 41.15 91.37 487.4
10 0.92 9.94 21.55 87.51 0.99 10.64 22.91 89.84
20 0.61 6.58 14.25 60.63 0.65 7.00 15.05 62.24
30 0.47 5.01 10.85 47.04 0.50 5.30 11.40 48.19
40 0.36 4.06 8.79 38.66 0.40 4.27 9.21 39.54
50 0.27 3.44 7.35 32.93 0.37 3.54 7.73 33.62
(B) volatility σ
Table 5: Certainty equivalent wealth gain to wealth ratio ∆(x)/x (%) as a function
of initial wealth x for changes in expected stock return µ and stock volatility
σ. The sensitivity of the certainty equivalent wealth gain to changes in the investment
opportunity is reported in this table. Baseline parameter values are set as follows: r = 0.02,
β = 0.04, γ = 4, ε = 1, ν = 0.05, and k = 0.3.
45
k̃ = 0.05 k̃ = 0.10
x \ δ Aaa Aa A B Aaa Aa A B
1 12.47 11.96 11.23 5.54 11.51 11.11 10.54 5.60
3 15.12 14.32 13.22 5.94 13.60 13.01 12.19 5.79
5 16.63 15.63 14.32 6.19 14.76 14.07 13.09 5.86
10 19.14 17.83 16.17 6.70 16.71 15.86 14.65 6.56
20 22.18 20.57 18.54 7.55 19.22 18.16 16.84 7.80
30 24.13 22.42 20.21 8.23 20.97 19.84 18.44 8.21
Table 6: Implicit value of life annuity as a function of initial wealth x for changes
in the parameter k̃ which is a weight for bequest motive of a retiree. Baseline
parameter values are set as follows: r = 0.02, β = 0.04, µ = 0.08, σ = 0.20, γ = 4, ε = 1,
ν = 0.05, and k = 0.3.
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A-rated annuity provider B-rated annuity provider
x \ ρ 0.2 − 0.2 0.2 − 0.2
1 12.89 13.25 5.63 5.55
5 17.83 18.19 6.22 6.35
10 20.87 21.21 6.77 6.75
15 22.89 23.24 7.28 7.10
20 24.43 24.77 7.68 7.55
Table 7: Implicit value of life annuity as a function of initial wealth x for changes
in the correlation ρ between stock price and annuity default event. Baseline
parameter values are set as follows: r = 0.02, β = 0.04, µ = 0.08, σ = 0.20, γ = 4, ε = 1,
ν = 0.05, k = 0.3, and b = 0.05.
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b̃ = 0.01 b̃ = 0.1
x \ δ Aaa Aa A B Aaa Aa A B
1 13.51 12.89 12.59 5.63 11.70 11.36 10.85 5.76
5 19.29 17.83 15.98 6.22 17.01 16.17 15.01 6.45
10 22.96 20.87 18.34 6.77 20.42 19.17 17.51 6.91
15 25.39 22.89 19.95 7.28 22.68 21.15 19.16 7.34
20 27.19 24.43 21.22 7.68 24.38 22.66 20.38 7.71
Table 8: Implicit value of life annuity as a function of initial wealth x for changes
in the standard deviation b̃ on mortality rates ν. Baseline parameter values are set
as follows: r = 0.02, β = 0.04, µ = 0.08, σ = 0.20, γ = 4, ε = 1, ν = 0.05, and k = 0.3.
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Figure 1: Pension fund returns in selected OECD countries (January-October
2008). Source: Impavido and Tower (2009).
Figure 2: Optimal consumption ratio and risky investment ratio as a function of
wealth x. This figure depicts the optimal consumption and investment ratios as a function
of initial wealth for different levels of default risk when the recovery rate k of the excess
claim to 30%. Baseline parameter values are set as follows: r = 0.02, β = 0.04, µ = 0.08,
σ = 0.20, γ = 4, ε = 1, ν = 0.05, and k = 0.3.
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Figure 3: Optimal consumption ratio and risky investment ratio as a function of
the coefficient γ of risk aversion. Baseline parameter values are set as follows: x = 5
(initial wealth), r = 0.02, β = 0.04, µ = 0.08, σ = 0.20, ε = 1, ν = 0.05, and k = 0.3.
Figure 4: Implicit value of life annuity as a function of wealth x. Baseline parameter
values are set as follows: r = 0.02, β = 0.04, µ = 0.08, σ = 0.20, γ = 4, ε = 1, ν = 0.05,
and k = 0.3.
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Figure 5: Implicit value of life annuity as a function of wealth x (Left figure:
k = 0.4, Right figure: k = 0.5). Baseline parameter values are set as follows: r = 0.02,
β = 0.04, µ = 0.08, σ = 0.20, γ = 4, ε = 1, and ν = 0.05.
Figure 6: Implicit value of annuity as a function of the coefficient γ of risk
aversion (Left figure : x = 5, Right figure: x = 30). Baseline parameter values are
set as follows: x = 5 and x = 30, r = 0.02, β = 0.04, µ = 0.08, σ = 0.20, ε = 1, ν = 0.05,
and k = 0.3.
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Figure 7: Certainty equivalent wealth gain to wealth ratio ∆(x)/x as a function
of wealth x. Baseline parameter values are set as follows: r = 0.02, β = 0.04, µ = 0.08,
σ = 0.20, γ = 4, ε = 1, ν = 0.05, and k = 0.3.
Figure 8: Certainty equivalent wealth gain to wealth ratio ∆(x)/x as a function
of wealth x (Left figure: k = 0.4, Right figure: k = 0.5. Baseline parameter values
are set as follows: r = 0.02, β = 0.04, µ = 0.08, σ = 0.20, γ = 4, ε = 1, and ν = 0.05.
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Figure 9: Certainty equivalent wealth gain to wealth ratio ∆(x)/x as a function
of the coefficient γ of risk aversion. Baseline parameter values are set as follows: x = 5
(initial wealth), r = 0.02, β = 0.04, µ = 0.08, σ = 0.20, ε = 1, ν = 0.05, and k = 0.3.
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Figure 10: The recovery amount for the insurance insolvency. Source: NOLHGA
(2011).
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